Abstract-The DNS Bandwidth Amplification Attack (BAA) is a distributed denial-of-service attack in which a network of computers floods a DNS server with responses to requests that have never been made. Amplification enters into the attack by virtue of the fact that a small 60-byte request can be answered by a substantially larger response of 4,000 bytes or more in size. We use the PRISM probabilistic model checker to introduce a Continuous Time Markov Chain model of the DNS BAA and three recently proposed countermeasures, and to perform an extensive cost-benefit analysis of the countermeasures. Our analysis, which is applicable to both DNS and DNSSec (a security extension of DNS), is based on objective metrics that weigh the benefits for a server in terms of the percentage increase in the processing of legitimate packets against the cost incurred by incorrectly dropping legitimate traffic. The results we obtain, gleaned from more than 450 PRISM runs, demonstrate significant differences between the countermeasures as reflected by their respective net benefits. Our results also reveal that DNSSec is more vulnerable than DNS to a BAA attack, and, relatedly, DNSSec derives significantly less benefit from the countermeasures.
I. INTRODUCTION DNS (Domain Name System) is a hierarchical naming system used to identify network hosts, so that a url (Uniform Resource Locator) can be used to address a machine in the internet. It is implemented using DNS name servers, which resolve resources (domains) into numeric IP addresses. DNS forms the logical backbone of the world wide web, and the service it provides is used on the order of a trillion times a day [11] . Any attack targeting DNS would thus seriously impact the security and basic operational status of the web and other services such as e-mail.
A Bandwidth Amplification Attack (BAA) is a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack where a network of computers (zombies) is used to flood a DNS server-the victim of the attack-with excessively large DNS responses to requests that have never been made [14] . A small 60-byte request can be answered by a substantially larger response of 4,000 bytes or more in size and this may be used to further imperil the victim.
A number of incidents involving BAA have been reported since 2002. An understanding of BAA countermeasures [8] , [19] , [30] and an assessment of their relative effectiveness are necessary for configuring today's DNS servers. Unfortunately, such an assessment has to date largely been lacking.
In this paper, we use the probabilistic model checker PRISM [13] to formally model and analyze the DNS BAA, along with three recently proposed countermeasures: packet filtering, random packet drops, and aggressive retries of legitimate packets. Moreover, we perform this analysis in the context of both DNS and DNSSec [5] , a recently proposed security extension of DNS that uses digital signatures to authenticate the source of DNS data. DNSSec eliminates the possibility of DNS cache-poisoning attacks [11] , [3] , but has been criticized for potentially increasing the probability of DNS DDoS attacks [9] .
Our approach is based on a Continuous Time Markov Chain (CTMC) model of the DNS BAA. CTMCs are widely used to model queuing systems with jobs having exponential size distribution and a Poisson arrival rate. Our model represents the bandwidth contention experienced by a victim server, while serving legitimate requests in the presence of the bogus traffic due to a BAA. The attack succeeds when a model state is reached where the available bandwidth (for processing legitimate DNS traffic) has been exhausted. As such, the attack probability can be computed by a probabilistic reachability property expressed in Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL). For both DNS and DNSSec, model parameter values are established using data from recent DDoS incidents or measurements of amplification effects reported in the literature.
The CTMC model we develop possesses the fundamental Markov property, which is presumed in [10] and elsewhere: bandwidth sharing, under the common assumption of Poisson session arrivals, is insensitive to the flow size and the packet arrival process. Consequently, we can reasonably consider that the conditional probability distribution of future states depends only upon the present state.
Collectively, our results, gleaned from more than 450 runs of the PRISM model checker, formally validate the existence of the DNS BAA, and demonstrate a nonlinearly increasing attack probability with an increasing number of zombies.
Our results also clearly show the effects of the proposed BAA countermeasures in terms of a reduction in the attack probability. They also reveal that DNSSec is more vulnerable than DNS to a BAA attack, and, relatedly, DNSSec derives significantly less benefit from the countermeasures.
To better understand their relative strengths and weaknesses, we develop a number of CTMC reward-based properties in support of an extensive cost-benefit analysis of the BAA countermeasures. The analysis is conducted from the perspective of bandwidth usage by a victim server. Benefits include an increase in the percentage of legitimate packets processed by the server, and an increase in the period of time during which bandwidth is available. Cost measures include the percentage of legitimate traffic dropped as false positives, and percentage deviation from a target attack probability. We also consider the computational cost of a countermeasure.
The CTMC analysis we choose to perform is transient because the impact of a BAA in the steady-state is independent of the available bandwidth. Also, it is imperative to mitigate BAA effects within as short a period of time as possible [2] . Countermeasure parameters are set to the minimal values that result in a zero attack probability, while avoiding unnecessary countermeasure costs [6] . This allows for a fair comparison, demonstrating significant differences between the countermeasures, as reflected by their respective net benefits.
To the best of our knowledge, our CTMC model is the first probabilistic model for the DNS BAA and associated countermeasures. Moreover, our model-checking results and associated cost-benefit analysis may be viewed as a framework for comparing security threat levels and countermeasure effectiveness. Such a comparison may be useful in making an informed choice of countermeasure or in developing a defense policy that selects the optimal countermeasure for a BAA or related attacks of varying strength.
The rest of this paper develops along the following lines. Section II outlines the principles of CTMC model checking. Section III describes the DNS BAA and associated countermeasures. Section IV introduces our PRISM CTMC model, and Section V presents our model-checking results and the results of our cost-benefit analysis. Section VI considers related work, while Section VII offers our concluding remarks.
II. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING USING CTMCS
Probabilistic model checking is an automated formal verification technique for modeling and analyzing systems or processes with probabilistic behavior, e.g. the CTMC of a queuing system. Model checking tools like PRISM [13] involve a combination of graph-theoretic algorithms for reachability analysis and iterative numerical solvers. Thus, it is possible to evaluate properties of the form P =? (φ) that compute the probability of some path that satisfies φ. Path formula φ is interpreted over the paths of the probabilistic model, which in our case is a CTMC. We define properties of the form F prop, where F is the "eventually" linear temporal operator and prop is a state assertion that evaluates to true or false for a single model state.
For our cost-benefit analysis, we take advantage of the CTMC rewards. CTMC allows us to attach rewards to states and transitions such that they get accumulated over time [21] . If at time t the CTMC has reached the n th state of some path, the reward is the sum of rewards accumulated in the preceding states (or transitions). Reward can be also interpreted as cost. In PRISM, the R operator is used for the analysis of reward-based properties. Four different types of rewardbased properties are supported, but for our analysis we use only cumulative reward properties of the form (C ≤ t), since they are appropriate for evaluating the effects of BAA countermeasures, in the small time period during which the attack has to be mitigated.
A model in PRISM is constructed as the parallel composition of its modules. A module is described by a collection of commands, each of which comprises a guard and one or more update actions:
The guard g is a predicate over model variables, whereas each update u i describes by assigning new values to the variables, a transition that the module can make. For CTMCs, λ i is the transition's rate, the parameter of a negative exponential distribution that governs the waiting time of the transition. If the guard is true, the updates are executed according to their rates. Commands can be labeled and this allows modules to interact with each other by synchronizing on identically labeled commands. In this case, the rate of the resulting transition is the product of the rates of the individual transitions.
III. THE DNS BAA AND PROPOSED COUNTERMEASURES
The DNS includes two types of servers, name servers and resolvers. DNS resolvers dispatch queries to name servers on behalf of clients that generate name-resolution requests. Once the resolver receives an answer it is forwarded to the client that originally generated the name-resolution request.
A. The DNS BAA
Let us assume that an attacker decides to attack the DNS resolver for the domain cs.stonybrook.edu, henceforth referred as the victim server.
1) The attacker prepares for the BAA by
• Creating a query that would generate a substantially larger response called as amplification record.
• Acquiring control of a large number of compromised hosts (zombies) to be used as attack sources.
• Acquiring a list of resolvers.
2) The attacker drives the zombies to send requests for the amplification record to the previously found DNS resolvers. In these requests the zombies replace the source-address field with the victim's IP address.
3) The resolvers direct a very large numbers of excessively large DNS responses to the victim server, thereby exhausting victim's available bandwidth.
B. Why DNS and DNSSec are vulnerable to BAA?
DNS requests and responses are sent as UDP packets, and are thus vulnerable to source-address spoofing. Also, a request can generate a substantially larger response, such that the ratio of the response size divided by the size of the request, termed as amplification factor (AF) can be as high as 73 [19] , [29] .
DNSSec prevents cache-poisoning attacks, but it does not provide protection against IP spoofing [25] . Some additional records are used in order to authenticate responses and this increases bandwidth consumption. For each DNSSec request a chain of responses [9] may be returned. For a full implementation of DNSSec and a chain of eight responses for each request, it is possible to have an AF of 271.2.
C. Countermeasures against DNS BAA
In the DNS, typical BAAs have been found to scale up to 2.8 Gbps. Some massive-scale attacks have also been reported that exploited around 140000 name servers resulting in a volume of 10 Gbps [19] . Any attempt to add more resources (server, bandwidth etc.), in order to handle the increased BAA load [15] has therefore a limited scope for improvement and this necessitates the study of countermeasures that mitigate the attack actively. We study three different countermeasures that either aim to reduce the attack traffic or alternatively to generate redundant legitimate traffic [30] .
• Filtering (FTR) Filtering tries to identify the attack sources and block the traffic originating from them. A relatively high packet arrival rate or the detection of unusually large packets can indicate the presence of a BAA [15] . From the algorithms described in [27] , [24] , [18] , [16] , [32] , we conclude that filtering offers relatively high accuracy with a false-positive rate as low as 10%. The computational cost of FTR depends on the filtering mechanism and the attack strength.
• Random Drops (RND): RND regulates incoming traffic by randomly dropping UDP packets [22] , [17] . During a BAA, the traffic arriving at the victim mainly comprises bogus packets, and a randomly dropped packet is therefore likely to be bogus. RND thus succeeds to mitigate the attack with negligible computational costs.
• Aggressive Retries (AGR): Legitimate clients are encouraged to generate traffic at a higher rate. In AGR, increasing the number of retries by one doubles the amount of legitimate traffic generated during each retry [30] , [20] . The downside is increased server workload and bandwidth consumption.
IV. THE PRISM MODEL FOR THE BAA
Our PRISM model for the BAA comes in four versions, one without any countermeasure in place (henceforth referred as the no-fix case), and one for each countermeasure.
A. The PRISM model for the DNS BAA
Our model defines two primary modules.
• Client Server (CS): CS represents the victim server.
A finite capacity queue emulates the bandwidth of the CS. This bandwidth is shared by legitimate DNS queries and responses, and the BAA traffic. When the queue becomes full, the available bandwidth is exhausted and all subsequently arriving packets are dropped.
• Net: Net provides an abstracted representation of all DNS resolvers and clients that generate legitimate and attack traffic for the CS. Two additional modules are used for modeling FTR and RND. Module Filter emulates a packet-filtering mechanism and module RandomDropper provides a random packetdropping mechanism.
The model parameters are as follows:
• bogus_rate: the rate at which each zombie generates spoofed bogus UDP requests. Since, the attack strength mainly depends on the number of zombies, we use a moderate bogus_rate of 10 requests per sec.
• zombies: the number of zombies used in the attack.
• UDP_rate: the rate at which legitimate UDP request and reply packets arrive at the CS. Since bandwidth sharing mainly depends on the attack strength, we consider a fixed arrival rate of 100 packets per second.
• BandwidthQueueUpperLimit (BQUL): the capacity of the bandwidth queue in terms of number of packets.
The maximum dedicated bandwidth required for a typical DNS server can be approximated to 1 Mbps [33] . The average packet size for DNS is 286 bytes (with request size of 60 bytes and response size of 512 bytes [29] Each action has an associated rate. Actions also have associated preconditions that need to be satisfied for their execution to take place. For synchronized actions, the effective rate is the product of rates of the individual actions. We now describe some of the important actions for each module.
• Receive UDP Packet: A legitimate UDP packet is received by the CS and a position in CS's bandwidth queue is occupied. This action is defined in modules CS and Net and occurs at the rate: (i) UDP_rate for the no-fix case, (ii) UDP_rate · (1 − fpp/100) for FTR, (iii) UDP_rate · (1 − rdp/100) for RND, (iii) (UDP_rate/2) · (1 + 2 retries ) for AGR.
• UDP Packet Lost: A UDP packet is dropped, because CS's bandwidth is full. This action is defined in modules CS and Net and it occurs at the same rates that are defined for the action Receive UDP Packet.
• Receive Bogus Packet: Action defined in modules CS and Net representing receipt of bogus packets by the CS and corresponding reduction of the available bandwidth. For the no-fix case this action occurs at an overall rate of bogus_rate · zombies · EAF. For the countermeasure models, rates are adjusted (except AGR) as in Receive UDP Packet by using parameters dp and rdp.
• Bogus Packet Lost: Action defined in modules CS and Net. It is the analogue of action UDP Packet Lost for the bogus UDP packets.
• Serve UDP Packet: CS action representing service of packets in bandwidth queue at rate serve_rate.
• Client Request: Action defined in modules CS and Net for dispatching a client request to the CS with rate UDP_rate. This action can be executed if the bandwidth is available. After having been executed once, this action is permanently disabled. It is used as a handle for computing the attack probability.
B. The PRISM model for the DNSSec BAA
The PRISM model for the DNSSec BAA differs from the DNS model only in the parameter values assigned to BQUL and EAF. BQUL affects the size of the model's state space, and as long it is not too large, model execution will complete in reasonable time.
A typical 70 bytes request in DNSSec can generate a response of 2257 bytes [9] and a reasonable value for the average size of legal packets is therefore V
. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS

A. Impact of BAA on DNS and DNSSec
We compute the attack probability using the CSL formula P=? [F DenialOfService] with DenialOfService becoming true, when the Client Request action is not completed by the CS under attack. Fig. 1 shows the impact of BAA on DNS and DNSSec in the absence of any countermeasure. The attack probability for DNSSec is consistently higher than that for DNS and this result formally validates the claim of [9] that DNSSec is more vulnerable to the BAA. The same figure also shows the results of curve fitting to the computed attack probabilities. We observe that, with an increasing number of zombies x, the attack probability F (x) increases nonlinearly according to the function A 1+(B/x) + C, where A, B and C are constants estimated by curve fitting. Fig. 2 shows the countermeasure effects on the BAA probability for DNS. All countermeasures, if configured with the shown parameters reduce the BAA probability, with a more important improvement for FTR, followed by AGR and RND. Fig. 2 indicates significant reductions in the BAA probability for the particular countermeasure parameters. However, these results alone cannot be the basis for a formal comparison between the countermeasures, since they follow different approaches to mitigate BAAs and depend on different parameters. Comparison of countermeasures cannot be based on the BAA probability for a client, because by selecting proper countermeasure settings, this probability can be made arbitrarily small or even zero. All benefits and costs associated with a countermeasure are experienced by the victim server and this is the reason for evaluating the countermeasures from the server's perspective.
B. Cost-benefit analysis for BAA countermeasures 1) Need for cost-benefit analysis:
To establish grounds for comparison, we run our model with the minimal values of countermeasure parameters needed to obtain a zero BAA probability, thus avoiding unnecessary countermeasure costs. This is a typical application of our method in [6] for repairing probabilistic models. Our analysis is limited to costs and benefits that refer to bandwidth usage and does not take into account other important aspects like computational or economic cost; these are considered in Section V-C. To ensure the validity of the results, we chose the cost-benefit metrics such that they do not compute the same quantity twice while at the same time they address the full set of effects of a countermeasure on bandwidth usage. For the cost-benefit analysis to be meaningful, the metrics should allow for a uniform interpretation of costs and benefits, thus making it possible to aggregate the results into a single netbenefit value.
2) Defining benefit and cost metrics: All metrics are evaluated as percentage values (no units), so as to compute the net benefit of a countermeasure [31] .
• Percentage B 1 of legitimate packets in total packets processed: An ideal countermeasure attempts to increase B 1 and it is therefore considered a benefit metric.
• Percentage time B 2 spent in states where bandwidth is available: A server is benefited if bandwidth availability is conserved for longer time periods.
• Percentage C 1 of legitimate packets dropped: False positive-based costs are observed for FTR and RND, but not for AGR.
• Percentage deviation C 2 from desired attack probability: Every FTR algorithm [27] , [24] , [18] , [16] , [32] is characterized by specific values for the dp and fpp and it is not possible to achieve a zero attack probability for high-volume BAAs. Such a countermeasure can still be a cost-efficient solution if the attack probability is within an acceptable range. We capture this situation in our analysis by introducing another cost which is defined as the deviation of the observed attack probability from the desired value. Net Benefit: For a countermeasure, net benefit = (
. The countermeasure offering the highest net benefit is the most cost-effective.
3) Computing benefits and costs: A BAA that is sustained for a relatively long duration is easy to detect and thus, attackers prefer to launch attacks in bursts [2] . It is therefore imperative to mitigate the effects of a BAA within a short period of time. This is the main reason for using cumulative reward properties that quantify accumulated rewards in the short-term up to a given time-bound, as opposed to the steadystate alternative [21] . From our experiments we also realized that, the impact of the BAA in the steady-state becomes independent of the available bandwidth, and the relative differences in the countermeasure effects are flattened. We define three reward properties P 1 , P 2 and P 3 of the form R{"<reward definition>"}=? [C<=t] , that evaluate the accumulated quantities for rewards R 1 , R 2 , R 3 as follows.
R 1 is a transition reward that assigns a unit yield to actions Receive UDP Packet and Client Request. So, property P 1 counts the total number of legitimate packets received, say P K 1 . R 2 is another transition reward with unit yield attached to the action Receive Bogus Packet. The property P 2 counts the total number of bogus packets received, say P K 2 . Then,
Reward R 3 is a state reward that assigns a unit yield per unit of time spent in the states where the victim's bandwidth is not full. Therefore, property P 3 yields the total time T 1 spent in states where bandwidth is available. Then, B 2 = T1 t · 100, where t is the time duration for which the countermeasure effects are evaluated which is same as the time-bound used for evaluating P 3 .
Due to false positives, FTR drops fpp% of the incoming legitimate traffic. So, the cost C 1 for FTR is fpp. The percentage of incoming traffic dropped by RND is given by rdp. Since incoming traffic includes bogus as well as legitimate traffic, RND drops rdp% of incoming legitimate traffic, thereby producing false positives. Thus, the cost C 1 for RND is equal to rdp. For AGR, C 1 is zero.
The cost C 2 is zero for RND and AGR, for which parameters rdp and retries can be in theory adjusted so that any desired attack probability can be achieved. For FTR, we compute C 2 by recording the percentage deviation from the desired attack probability, if any.
4) Determining countermeasure parameters:
Studies of different filtering algorithms show that on average FTR has a dp of 90% and fpp of 10%. While these values depend on the accuracy of the algorithm, they remain unchanged for different rates of incoming traffic. Since FTR has fixed dp and fpp, we cannot always achieve zero attack probability for it. The parameters of AGR and RND, however, can in theory be adjusted so that the attack probability becomes zero. In practice, upper bounds should be defined for rdp and retries. Table I shows the countermeasure parameters required to achieve zero attack probability for RND and AGR with the number of zombies varied from 10 to 10000 so that we obtain 28 distinct values. For brevity, only 5 representative values for zombies   FTR  RND  AGR  DNS  DNSSec  DNS  DNSSec  DNS  DNSSec  B1  B2  C1  C2  B1  B2  C1  C2  B1  B2  C1  B1  B2  C1  B1  B2  B1  B2   100 zombies are shown in Table I . For both DNS and DNSSec, a countermeasure was enabled only when a non-zero attack probability was observed for the no-fix case. In the DNS case, this happened for zombies ≥ 200 whereas for DNSSec, the countermeasures were enabled when zombies ≥ 100. The empty cells indicate that a countermeasure was not enabled for the corresponding number of zombies. We report rdp for RND and retries for AGR. From Table I , we see that as the attack strength increases, the required countermeasure strength increases too. We also observe that higher countermeasure parameter values are required for DNSSec when compared with the parameter values for DNS. This validates our result from Fig. 1 that DNSSec is more vulnerable than DNS to a BAA.
5) Performing cost-benefit analysis:
Using the countermeasure parameter values from Table I and the PRISM reward properties that were previously discussed, we compute B 1 , B 2 , C 1 and C 2 for FTR, RND and AGR.
The time-bound t for the cumulative reward properties is selected such that it allows the model dynamics to reasonably evolve, while at the same time prevents it from attaining steady-state (where effects on bandwidth usage are independent of the available bandwidth). An appropriate time-bound t = 0.1 was found by experimentation. Table II reports the costs and benefits for FTR, RND and AGR. Empty cells indicate that a countermeasure was not enabled for the corresponding number of zombies.
Figs. 3-6 show the net benefit for FTR, RND and AGR computed using results from Table II . We observe that,
• For DNS and DNSSec, the net benefits of FTR, RND and AGR decrease as more zombies participate in the attack.
• From Figs. 3-4 , we observe that for DNS, FTR is the most cost-effective countermeasure when zombies ≤ 2000. Thereafter, AGR offers the highest net benefit. The net benefit of FTR rapidly drops for zombies > 2000, since, as seen from • The relative performance of AGR and RND depends on the desired attack probability. As we decrease this probability, AGR gradually exhibits better net benefit. For our experiments, the desired attack probability was set to the minimum possible value, i.e. zero, and the countermeasure parameters were adjusted accordingly. Consequently, we observed that the AGR always performs better than the RND.
C. Computational cost of a countermeasure
The computational cost of a countermeasure is reflected in the amount of computing resources (e.g. processors) required by the countermeasure. While the computational cost increases infrastructure cost, it does not affect the DNS server's performance, since typically a countermeasure is supported on a separate piece of hardware; e.g. FTR can be implemented by firewalls. However, computational cost must be considered while deploying a countermeasure since this cost can offset any gains obtained in bandwidth usage. We now estimate computational cost for FTR, which can be potentially high compared to the cost for the two other countermeasures.
The computational cost for FTR is calculated based on the aggregate incoming traffic that has to be filtered and can thus be determined without using our PRISM model. By applying curve-fitting to the data reported in [16] , we find that for the xPF filtering algorithm, the number of instructions executed per packet is + 6123.14, where par is the rate at which IP packets arrive at the server. For a generic four-stage instruction pipeline, four instructions execute in seven cycles. Thus, FTR needs
+10715 processor cycles per packet. For a 733 MHz processor [28] , this translates to (1.2 + 1.4 · 10 −5 ·par) processors required to sustain FTR performance for packets arriving at rate par. The processor utilization by FTR is thus directly proportional to par and in turn to the number of zombies, leading to potentially very high computational cost if a large number of zombies participate in the attack.
D. Significance and limitations of cost-benefit analysis
Although, we performed experiments with a single value of serve_rate, the conclusions of our cost-benefit analysis remain valid even if the serve_rate changes. As an example, our results show that the AGR offers higher net benefit than RND. If we increase serve_rate, then for both RND and AGR B 1 tends to zero, B 2 tends to 100 and for RND C 1 tends to zero. This causes the net benefit of AGR to remain always higher than the net benefit of RND.
In general, we expect computational costs for RND and AGR to be lower than the computational cost for FTR. However, to increase our confidence for the countermeasure cost-effectiveness in BAAs of very high volume, we need to precisely measure the computational costs since a high computational cost may hinder one from deploying a countermeasure solution with zero attack probability for high volume BAAs.
Our cost-benefit analysis can be potentially applied to other network security problems, which can be efficiently analyzed by probabilistic model checking. Any similar approach should use valid and meaningful cost and benefit metrics, according to the principles mentioned in section V-B.
VI. RELATED WORK
We presented a CTMC-based analysis of the DNS BAA and its countermeasures by probabilistic model checking. Our analysis formally validates the existence of the DNS BAA and defines CTMC reward properties that allow a comparison between the costs and the benefits of the proposed countermeasures, in terms of bandwidth usage by a DNS server.
In related work, there are some proposals for the formal analysis of DoS attacks by model checking, which differ from our analysis in several ways. However, there is no formal analysis for the DNS BAA. In [1] , the authors use probabilistic rewriting logic to model a DoS-resistant 3-way handshaking in the Transmission Control Protocol. Instead of using a formal stochastic model like a CTMC, they generate a timed probabilistic model from the developed algebraic specification, which is then analyzed by statistical model checking. This is a simulation-based analysis and consequently it cannot be as accurate as the probabilistic model checking approach. Statistical model checking is also used in [4] , in order to analyze the ASV protocol as a DoS countermeasure. Cost and benefit metrics based on rewards attached to the underlying formal model are not supported.
Another related work is [7] , which presents a Discrete Time Markov Chain model for a DoS threat against an authentication protocol. The cost-based analysis framework of [23] is instantiated in a probabilistic model checking framework that compares the cost incurred to the attacker against the cost incurred to the honest participants during a DoS. CTMC based analysis with reward properties is proposed in [12] , as a mean to analyze a DDoS attack against the Mobile IP and Seamless IP diversity based Generalized Mobility Architecture. In both [7] , [12] no analysis and comparison of related countermeasures is provided.
Finally, in [26] a characterization of an amplification attack is introduced by means of states where some measure comparisons hold true. This is called measure checking and is implemented with rewriting logic, an executable specification that is model checked in the Maude tool. This approach focuses on automatically finding known attacks and verifying that a patch for an attack achieves its aim, but no comparison between alternative solutions is supported.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We used the PRISM probabilistic model checker to formally model and analyze the DNS BAA and its countermeasures. Since BAA is aimed at DNS servers, it was natural and beneficial to model it in PRISM as a CTMC, with corresponding arrival rates for benign and malicious DNS traffic. The model-checking results we thus obtain clearly demonstrate that DNSSec, which protects against DNS cache-poisoning attacks, is more vulnerable to a BAA than DNS. They also show, with the aid of curve-fitting, a nonlinear increase in the attack probability with an increasing number of zombies. We also presented a flexible cost-benefit analysis of BAA countermeasures that allows one to identify the most costeffective countermeasure for attacks of varying strengths.
As future work, we intend to extend our BAA countermeasure cost-benefit analysis to BAA countermeasures that combine FTR, RND and AGR. The challenge here is to determine the optimum values for countermeasure parameters (dp, fpp, rdp and retries) to achieve the desired attack probability while maximizing benefit and minimizing cost. The source files for our PRISM models of the DNS BAA are available from http://www.cs.stonybrook.edu/ ∼ sas/baa/.
